When former President Donald Trump soon returns to court in New York City, there are likely to be few visual surprises. Trump’s hush-money trial before New York Judge Juan Merchan is scheduled to start with jury selection on April 15, 2024.

Monday’s scene will likely echo the one from 2023, when Trump walked past cameras into a courthouse in order to appear for his arrest on 34 felony charges for allegedly committing business fraud and paying porn star Stormy Daniels money to remain quiet about her claims of their sexual encounter. As historic as the moment was, the visuals were rather bland.

Still photos from inside the courtroom will capture the scene silently, so even if the former president speaks out of turn, as he occasionally does in court, outside viewers will not hear the audio. New York courts allow cameras into criminal proceedings, but journalists must get permission to be there, and judges will impose different rules on a case-by-case basis.

Dozens of news photographers will be posted inside and outside the courthouse, working within strict guidelines about where they can stand and when. Yet the courtroom scene is not likely to be the sort of media free-for-all shown in movies and TV shows. Judges and news organizations may work for weeks or months to ensure that court operations run smoothly during spectacular cases.

I have studied the way visual journalists cover criminal justice for 20 years. All this preplanning tends to yield pretty matter-of-fact imagery, but three things will be worth looking for in the visual coverage of Trump’s appearance: surprises, body language and symbolic juxtapositions.

The unexpected

Surprises will be hard to come by. True, the former president likes to play to the cameras when he can, but he faces legal challenges on multiple fronts, and so far, he has been compelled to maintain a civil demeanor when being photographed in court.

Even in the most camera-friendly jurisdictions, such as New York and Florida, photojournalists are subject to strict rules about placement and procedure. My research for my 2021 book, “Seeing Justice,” found that media and the court system often work together to balance the public’s interest in a case with a need to maintain order.

In fact, arrangements for major cases can mimic the plans for major league sporting events. During the 2013 George Zimmerman trial for the murder of Black teenager Trayvon Martin in central Florida, for example, court representatives met with local TV engineers to determine where news vans could park. Cameras were set up inside the courtroom, and an overflow room was arranged so the journalists who didn’t have access to the courtroom could still watch the proceedings.

Body language

During Trump’s upcoming trial, viewers will be watching for cues from his body language, particularly his facial expressions. Often visual coverage for a criminal court case lets the audience know what the accused looks like, but most viewers are well-acquainted with the former president’s appearance. Instead, people will be watching for clues about his mood.

Will the former president look angry, as he has during previous court appearances? Will he look solemn? Nervous?

Visual coverage can often expose so much more than words about a person’s mood. Human beings instinctively read faces as part of social interaction. Infants track faces before other visual information.

Some experts estimate that a majority of the information people take in from a conversation can be nonverbal, though exactly how much they rely on this kind of information is subject to debate. What is clearly established in the research is that, whether in-person or through media, we are drawn to faces. We notice them, read them and respond emotionally to them. Mirror neurons, a type of brain cell, are activated when we read the faces of others, prompting our own emotions to flicker in reaction to others’ apparent feelings..

Coverage from Trump’s appearance before Merchan on April 4, 2023, for instance, included observations about his body language, how he walked into the building, how he quietly interacted with his lawyers, and so on. He waited to be among supporters in Florida that day before more forcefully expressing his anger and frustration.

Visual irony

Finally, those of us who are deeply interested in visual communication will be watching for symbolic juxtapositions. A still photo from the pool camera in April 2023, for example, included a bulletin board in the background in which a small American flag had been inserted.

Who put it there, and why? This tiny American flag, displayed next to what looks like a photocopied map of the state of New York and other nondescript notices, added a touch of the mundane to the historic moment.

The courtroom where Trump sat was just one of many of its kind across the country. The plain bulletin board with its little flag robbed the scene of grandiosity normally associated with the presidency.

The photojournalists stationed in and outside of the courthouse will be very busy and likely tense as they prepare to capture photos and video of the former president. But this chaotic scene will be largely hidden from the audience.

Photojournalists will likely work from cordoned-off pens in the Manhattan Criminal Courthouse, and if their scrums are anything like the others I’ve studied over time, they’ll gather very early, stake claim to key spots and spend far more time waiting than recording video.

Visual journalists from competing organizations will greet one another as professionals do at a convention, with handshakes and catch-up conversations. After all, many of these photojournalists will spend more time in these groupings than they will with members of their own news organizations. The friendly mood will stop cold, though, once the action starts.

Even though everyone knows what Trump looks like, and even though his walk through the hallway may take only a matter of seconds, it will be essential to capture that moment, for their own job, their professional reputation and, of course, to satisfy the public’s curiosity.

Mary Angela Bock has received funding from the Association for Education for Journalism and Mass Communication. Since October 2023, Bock has contributed $150 to ActBlue, a political action committee that fundraises for Democratic nonprofits and politicians.

It has now been more than two years since German Chancellor Olaf Scholz entered a new compound word into the jargon of global politics: “Zeitenwende.”

Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech of Feb. 27, 2022 – the word loosely translates as “turning point” – came as the world was coming to grips with Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It marked a major shift for the world’s third-largest economy and its foreign and defense policy, including significant investments in Germany’s depleted armed forces.

With NATO’s 75th anniversary summit approaching in July, has the Scholz government lived up to its promises? And what are the implications of Germany’s pivot for the United States?

As an expert on international security, I am well aware that critics on both sides of the Atlantic argue the Scholz government has failed to adequately strengthen Germany’s armed forces and that its military support for Ukraine is insufficient. Yet when measuring Scholz’s actions against the objectives he originally articulated, there is reason to believe that he has mostly delivered on his promises.

Promises delivered on

Beyond immediate support for Ukraine, Scholz formulated two major long-term goals in his speech. First, strengthen the German military with a large, one-time investment, followed by a permanent increase in defense spending. Second, adopt a more assertive foreign policy in defense of a rules-based international order. To this end, Scholz sought to align Germany even more closely with its transatlantic allies, while reducing the country’s energy and economic dependence on Russia and China.

Taken together, the Zeitenwende amounted to a shift from a strategy of engagement with Russia and China to one of deterrence and derisking – that is, efforts to diversify supply chains to make Germany less vulnerable to economic coercion.

Scholz’s government has created a 100 billion-euro (about US$108 billion) special fund for the Bundeswehr – Germany’s armed forces – and for the first time since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Germany will spend 2% of its GDP on its military in 2024. Scholz has further promised to keep that level of funding into the 2030s.

These spending levels are unlikely to turn Germany’s military into the “powerful, cutting-edge” force Scholz envisioned. The Bundeswehr has “too little of everything,” as the German Parliament’s commissioner for the armed forces recently concluded in a scathing assessment.

Over the next decade, however, a 2% spending level could allow for a meaningful modernization, especially if efforts to cut bureaucratic red tape succeed.

Germany’s support for Ukraine

Germany is also the second-largest provider of military assistance to Ukraine after the U.S. From January 2022 to January 2024, it made military aid commitments totaling 17.7 billion euros (about $19 billion).

Furthermore, as the largest budget contributor to the EU, the Scholz government was instrumental in channeling a staggering 77.2 billion euros (about $83 billion) of financial assistance from Brussels to Ukraine during this period. And through shrewd diplomacy, Scholz first opened the door to EU membership talks with Ukraine and then helped secure additional funding of 50 billion euros ($54 billion) to save Ukraine from economic collapse as the war against Russia drags on.

Yet, Scholz faces criticism for denying Ukraine some weapons systems, including Taurus cruise missiles that could strike deep into Russia.

His argument is that prudence is necessary to avoid escalating the conflict, but Germany’s conservative opposition and parts of his own coalition maintain that Scholz must show greater resolve to deter Russia.

What’s clear is that Germany has come a long way since receiving ridicule for offering Ukraine 5,000 helmets ahead of Russia’s 2022 invasion. And Scholz’s room for maneuver is limited by a German public that remains wary of wielding military power abroad.

Changing course on Russia

More significant than higher defense spending and aid to Ukraine, then, might be changes to the direction of German foreign and security policy. Ironically, the land of revered strategic thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz had never released a national security strategy prior to the Zeitenwende.

Since then, the Scholz government unveiled Germany’s first national security strategy in June 2023, and a month later its first China strategy. Both documents provide cleareyed assessments of the growing challenges posed by Russia and China – risks that previous governments appeared to ignore.

Germany has already taken steps to implement its new strategy, most notably on Russia. Before the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Germany imported 55% of its gas from Russia. By January 2023, it had achieved energy independence from Russia.

Few thought this was economically and politically possible, especially because Scholz’s party had a long-standing “special relationship” with Russia – from former Chancellor Willy Brandt’s “Ostpolitik,” which sought to normalize relations with the Soviet Union and its Eastern European allies, to Gerhard Schröder’s cozying up with Putin.

Reducing dependence on China presents a more formidable challenge for Germany, and it is still too early to assess the impact of the Zeitenwende on this critical relationship.

Notably, the new China strategy sets a more assertive tone: “China has changed. [Hence] we need to change our approach to China.” Berlin now emphasizes derisking its economic relationship with China, whose raw materials, cheap factories and growing middle class had long allowed German carmakers and other export-oriented companies to thrive.

In 2023, the Scholz government reached a landmark deal with American tech giant Intel to build a 30 billion-euro ($32 billion) chip factory in Magdeburg, with the long-term aim of reducing dependence on microchips from Taiwan.

Shifting public sentiment

Convincing a skeptical German public of the more assertive international role envisioned by Scholz will take time, yet there are signs that an important shift is underway. In a joint survey released by the Pew Research Center and Körber-Stiftung in November 2023, 60% of respondents concurred that German companies should become less dependent on China, even if it results in economic losses; 66% supported continued military assistance to Ukraine; and 72% agreed that Germany should spend at least 2% of its GDP on defense.

Looking ahead to NATO’s July 2024 summit in Washington, D.C., Germany’s strategic pivot presents an opportunity for the U.S. While U.S. policymakers cannot expect the two nations’ interests to align consistently, they have reasons to embrace Germany’s reorientation toward the transatlantic alliance.

Berlin’s plans to permanently station a brigade in Lithuania by 2027 will strengthen NATO’s eastern flank. And its increased defense spending puts pressure on other European states to meet the 2% target too. In addition, derisking as an economic strategy will require the building of new partnerships and pathways, and the U.S. and its European allies might mutually benefit if they cooperate closely on this critical task.

As the Zeitenwende continues into its third year, Germany faces a host of challenges, and some question whether the Scholz government will complete its term.

Yet, even if Scholz’s efforts to implement the Zeitenwende were cut short, the legacy of his strategic pivot is likely to endure.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

For decades, Iran and Israel have been engaged in a “shadow war.”

Falling short of direct military confrontation, this conflict has been characterized by war through other means – through proxies, cyber attacks, economic sanctions and fiery rhetoric.

Events over the last few weeks in the Middle East have, however, changed the nature of this conflict. First, Israel – it is widely presumed – broke diplomatic norms by bombing an Iranian mission in Syria. The operation, in which 12 individuals were killed – including seven officials from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp Quds Force – ratcheted up the stakes.

It also crossed a new threshold. Never before had that many Quds Force or other Iranian military officials been killed in a single attack by Iran’s adversaries. Almost immediately, rhetoric from leaders in Tehran indicated Iran would respond swiftly and dramatically.

Then, on April 13, 2024, Iran responded by crossing a line it had, to date, not crossed: launching a direct attack on Israeli soil.

Iran’s attack against Israel was also qualitatively and quantitatively different than anything Tehran had directly attempted before. Israel Defense Forces spokesperson Rear Admiral Daniel Hagari said that it consisted of at least 170 drones, 30 cruise missiles and 120 surface-to-surface missiles. The attack was launched from positions in Iran, Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

In physical terms, the barrage caused little damage. Hagari said that 99% of the projectiles sent by Iran were intercepted by air and missile defenses, and that only one person was injured. For now, it appears that Tehran is content with its own response; the Iranian Mission to the United Nations posted a message on social media following the attack indicating that the operation had concluded.

But as an expert on national security and the Middle East, I believe the Iranian attack was not about inflicting physical damage on Israel. It was more about Iran attempting to restore deterrence with Israel following the Damascus incident and showing strength to its domestic audience. In so doing, Tehran’s leaders are also conveying the message that should Israel conduct more aggressive actions against Iranian interests, they are willing to escalate.

Friends, then longtime foes

Iran and Israel have been adversaries virtually since the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when the Shah of Iran fled the country to be replaced by a theocracy. New leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini broke the former regime’s ties with Israel and quickly adopted a strident anti-Israel agenda both in words and policy.

In the decades since, Israel and Iran have inflicted harm on the other’s interests in both the physical and virtual worlds. This has included major terrorist attacks backed by Iran against Israeli interests in Argentina in 1992 and 1994, Tehran’s backing of Hezbollah’s grinding insurgency against Israel in southern Lebanon, and the major operational support provided to Hamas that in part enabled the attacks on Oct. 7, 2023.

Meanwhile, Iranian officials have blamed Israel for the killing of senior military officials and scientists related to Iran’s nuclear program in Iran or elsewhere in the region.

The lack of open acknowledgment by Israel of the killings was to create the illusion of plausible deniability and implant doubt about who was actually responsible.

In recent years, Iran has relied heavily on its “axis of resistance” – militant groups in Iraq, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and Gaza that share some of Tehran’s goals, notably in regard to countering Israel and weakening U.S. influence in the region. In the monthslong conflict sparked by the Oct. 7 attack, Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen and the Islamic Resistance in Iraq network have repeatedly attacked Israeli and U.S. interests.

‘A clear message’

So what comes next? A lot will depend on how Israel and the U.S. respond.

Officially, U.S. President Joe Biden has stated that in repelling the Iran missiles and drones, Israel had sent “a clear message to its foes that they cannot effectively threaten [its] security.”

But there are reports that Biden has warned Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu Israel should “take the win” and could not rely on the U.S. supporting any offensive operations against Iran.

A number of factors will determine whether Iran and Israel continue to launch more attacks against each other out in the open, or revert to shadow warfare.

These include how each side reads domestic sentiment. Netanyahu is already facing pressure based on his handling of the war in Gaza and previous domestic concerns regarding attempts to influence the Israeli Supreme Court, among other matters.

Likewise, inside Iran, the United Nations reports that two years after major public protests inside the country based on socio-economic conditions, the regime in Iran continues to ruthlessly suppress dissent.

Apart from domestic considerations, both Iran and Israel will also weigh the risks of more open confrontation against their current operational capabilities. Here, it seems clear that neither Iran nor Israel can decisively win a prolonged military campaign against each other.

Israel’s powerful military certainly has the ability to launch air and missile strikes against Iranian interests in the region, as they have already demonstrated in Syria and Lebanon for many years. And Israel probably could do the same for a short period of time directly into Iran.

But Israel would face major challenges in sustaining a prolonged combined arms campaign in Iran, including the relatively small size of the Israel Defense Forces compared with Iran’s military, and the physical distance between both countries. Israel has openly conducted military exercises for years that seem more focused on simulating air strikes and perhaps special operations raids against a smaller number of targets inside Iran, like nuclear facilities.

Moreover, launching a new front by directly attacking Iran risks diverting Israeli resources away from more immediate threats in Gaza, the West Bank and its northern border with Lebanon.

Of course, Israel has fought and won wars with its regional adversaries in the past.

But the conflicts Israel fought against its Arab neighbors in 1967 and 1973 took place in a different military age and prior to the development of drone warfare, cyber operations and support to Iranian-backed proxies and partners in Israel’s immediate neighborhood.

Wary of further escalation

A similar type of campaign against Iran would be unlike anything Israel has faced. Israel would no doubt find it difficult to achieve its objectives without a high-level of support from the United States, and probably Arab countries like Jordan and Egypt. And there is no indication that such backing would be forthcoming.

Iran, too, will be wary of further escalation. Tehran demonstrated on April 13 that it possesses a large – and perhaps growing – inventory of ballistic missiles, drones and cruise missiles.

However, the accuracy and effectiveness of many of these platforms remains in question – as evidenced by the seeming ease in which most were shot down. The Israeli and U.S. air and missile defense network in the region continues to prove reliable in that regard.

Given the realities and risks, I believe it seems more likely that Iran will seek to revert back to its unconventional warfare strategy of supporting its proxy axis of resistance. Overt attacks, such as the one carried out on April 13, may be reserved for signaling resolve and demonstrating strength to its domestic audience.

The danger is now that war has come out of the shadows, it may be hard to put it back there.

Javed Ali does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.