The Ashéninka woman with the painted face radiated a calm, patient confidence as she stood on the sandy banks of the Amonia River and faced the loggers threatening her Amazonian community.
The loggers had bulldozed a trail over the mahogany and cedar saplings she had planted, and blocked the creeks her community relied on for drinking water and fish. Now, the outsiders wanted to widen the trail into a road to access the towering rainforests that unite the Peruvian and Brazilian border along the Juruá River.
María Elena Paredes, as head of the Sawawo Hito 40 monitoring committee, said no, and her community stood by her.
She knew she represented not just her community and the other Peruvian Indigenous communities, but also her Brazilian cousins downstream who also rely on these forests, waters and fish.
Explosive growth of illegal roads as government pulled back
During Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency in Brazil and the COVID-19 pandemic, the Amazon rainforest has witnessed explosive growth in informal and illegal roads.
The Amazonian departments of Ucayali, Loreto and Madre de Dios, Peru, saw road expansion increase by 25% from 2019 to 2020 and 16% from 2020 to 2021. In the Brazilian Amazon, roads are being built at such a rapid pace that researchers are turning to artificial intelligence to map the expansion.
Roads are the most damaging infrastructure in the tropical rainforest, bringing deforestation and a host of related cultural and environmental impacts.
A few hours downriver from where she confronted the loggers, Paredes and other Peruvian Indigenous leaders met with their Brazilian counterparts in September 2022 to discuss strategies to stop the invasions. The Brazilian leaders included Francisco Piyako and Isaac Piyako, two Indigenous Ashéninka brothers who ran for election at the federal and state levels but lost amid the southern Amazon’s conservative turn toward agribusiness.
While the Brazilian election included more Indigenous candidates than any in Brazilian history, with the 175 candidates representing a 37% increase over 2018, few of those candidates won.
Two Indigenous women with strong anti-Bolsonaro platforms emerged from the election as federal deputies: Sônia Guajajara will represent São Paulo state and Célia Xakriabá the state of Minas Gerais. Marina Silva, a former environment minister and past Green Party presidential candidate, also won election as a federal deputy in São Paulo state. None of them directly represents the Amazon.
These results place the future of the Amazon very much in the hands of Brazil’s national election.
Peru also held elections on Oct. 2, but at the regional and municipal levels. In the Ucayali region, 37% of the candidates were Indigenous. As of Oct. 3, votes were still being counted, but Indigenous candidates have historically had very poor showings. The vote leaders for president of the Peruvian Amazonian state of Ucayali were an ex-governor and coca farmer connected to a corruption investigation and a promoter of agribusiness.
In Maria Elena Paredes’ home district, Yurúa, pro-conservation Indigenous residents did win, providing one of few positive signs for the pro-environment movement in the Amazon.
Fifteen years ago, the legendary Indigenous leader Edwin Chota protested the road that Paredes and her community are blocking today. He and three colleagues were later gunned down in 2014 after receiving death threats from loggers and traffickers. The killers remain free in the borderlands.
This summer, I visited Chota’s grave with over 20 of the surviving family and community members of the four slain defenders. Most of these families are afraid to return to their beautiful forests in the borderland community of Saweto, and instead remain on the outskirts of the city of Pucallpa, squeezed into dilapidated houses with intermittent electricity and clean water.
Far from their village, the children cannot build their cultural and environmental knowledge in the forest.
Five participants from Saweto were among the 120 Indigenous representatives from 13 ethnicities in the Amazon borderlands who joined our NASA workshop to discuss how they can use satellite imagery to monitor changes to the forest and climate. By integrating Indigenous ecological knowledge and geospatial analysis of the Amazon rainforest and climate, scientists and Indigenous groups can both better track the changing Amazon.
The Indigenous mothers, fathers and children told us they want training and education that will help them to protect their territory, adapt to climate change and build a sustainable future. Our NASA SERVIR project is creating mapping platforms based on satellite imagery analysis that the Indigenous communities, nongovernment organizations and government agencies can use to monitor roads, deforestation and climate change.
Everyone loses if the Indigenous defenders of the Amazon do not have the support and educational opportunities needed to be safe, prosperous and empowered to protect their rainforest home.
This article was updated Oct. 3, 2022, with election results.
David S. Salisbury has collaborations with the communities of Sawawo, Saweto and Apiwtxa. He is co-investigator of a NASA SERVIR Amazonia Applied Science Team grant led by Dr. Stephanie Spera at the University of Richmond. He is a Board member of the Upper Amazon Conservancy, and has collaborated on research with ACCA, MAAP, and other Amazonian sources linked in the article. His book, Defending the Amazon, will be forthcoming in 2023.
A deadly attack in Moscow on March 22, 2024, exposed the vulnerability of the Russian capital to the threat of the Islamic State group and its affiliate ISIS-K. But it also displayed the reach of the network, leading some terror experts to ponder: Could a U.S. city be next?
As a terrorism expert and a scholar specializing in radical Islamist militant groups and the geographical scope of their attacks, I believe these incidents underscore the growing threat of ISIS-K both within the region it draws support from and on an international scale.
Amplifying influence
A successful terror attack on a Western capital is certainly something ISIS-K, or Islamic State Khorasan Province, aspires to. The intent behind the group’s activities is to bolster its position among jihadist factions by means of audacious and sophisticated attacks.
It is a strategy that showcases ISIS-K’s capabilities for spectacular operations, distinguishing it from potential rival groups. But it also enhances ISIS-K’s appeal, attracting both supporters and resources in the shape of funding and fighters.
By establishing a unique identity in a crowded extremist landscape, ISIS-K aims to undercut its competitors’ influence and assert its dominance in the jihadist sphere of the Khorasan region it targets, including Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other Central Asian countries.
ISIS-K’s ambition extends beyond territorial control, engaging in a broader contest for ideological supremacy and resource acquisition globally.
An expanding threat
This global reach and ambition are evident in ISIS-K’s recent planned operations.
These include a suicide bombing in Iran in January 2024 and thwarted attacks across Europe, notably the foiled plots in Germany and the Netherlands in July 2023.
ISIS-K’s propaganda has persistently framed the U.S. as its principal enemy – a narrative that is fueled by America’s extensive military and economic efforts to dismantle Islamic State operations since 2014.
The United States’ involvement, especially in collaboration with the Taliban — ISIS-K’s primary regional adversary — has placed America firmly in the group’s crosshairs.
Employing tactics refined during the period that the Islamic State group was most active, ISIS-K seeks to inspire lone-wolf attacks and radicalize individuals in the U.S.
The 2015 mass shooting in San Bernardino, California, which left 14 dead, and the 2016 shooting at a nightclub in Orlando, Florida, that resulted in at least 49 deaths, were both attacks inspired by the Islamic State group.
Targeting major powers
Taking its lead from the Islamic State group, ISIS-K in 2022 publicly condemned America, calling it an enemy of Islam.
Of course, ISIS-K had by then already demonstrated its intention to harm U.S. interests, notably in a 2021 Kabul airport attack in which 13 U.S. service members and 170 Afghans were killed.
ISIS-K views the U.S. in much the same way as it does Russia: both as a military and an ideological foe.
While it is easier for ISIS-K to penetrate Russian territory, given the country’s geographical proximity to major Islamist recruitment centers, such as Tajikistan, the potential for strikes in the United States remains significant.
In 2023, U.S. authorities investigated a group of Uzbek nationals suspected of entering the country from Mexico with the assistance of traffickers linked to the Islamic State group, underscoring the group’s threat.
Targeting American interests serve multiple purposes for ISIS-K. By striking against the U.S., ISIS-K not only retaliates against Washington’s counterterrorism efforts but also aims to deter U.S. involvement in regions of interest to ISIS-K.
It also taps into historical grievances against the U.S. and Western interventions in Muslim countries – from the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq to the stationing of U.S. troops in significant Islamic centers in the Middle East, notably Saudi Arabia.
Countering a persistent threat
In response to the growing threat of Islamic State group affiliates, the United States has adopted a comprehensive strategy combining military, intelligence and law enforcement efforts.
Military operations have targeted ISIS-K leaders and infrastructure in Afghanistan, while security cooperation with regional and international partners such as Uzbekistan continues to monitor and counter the group’s activities.
On the home front, law enforcement and homeland security agencies remain vigilant, working to identify and thwart potential ISIS-K plots.
But as many experts had warned, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 has posed new challenges, inadvertently transforming that country once again into a safe haven and operational base for terrorist groups.
This retreat has also resulted in a significant loss of on-the-ground intelligence amid doubts over the efficacy of relying on the Taliban for counterterrorism operations.
Meanwhile, the Taliban are struggling to prevent or counteract ISIS-K attacks within their own borders.
The successful ISIS-K plots against Iran and Russia also reveal another vulnerability: When a country is distracted or preoccupied with other security concerns or conflicts, it can potentially compromise the effectiveness of its counterterrorism efforts.
Recent years have witnessed a decrease in high-profile attacks by groups like the Islamic State, leading many to conclude that the threat was waning. As a result, global attention — and with it, intelligence and security resources — has shifted toward escalating power rivalries and conflicts across the Pacific, Eastern Europe and the Middle East.
Yet, this shift risks underestimating the enduring threat terrorist groups pose, laying bare the dangers of complacency.
The Moscow attack emphasizes ISIS-K’s resolve to expand its influence, raising concerns about the potential threat to Western nations, including the United States. Considering ISIS-K’s track record and clear aspirations, it would be naive to dismiss the possibility of an attack on American soil.
Sara Harmouch does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
Small changes to U.S. trade policy could significantly reduce the number of migrants arriving at the southern border, according to our peer-reviewed study, which was recently published in The World Economy.
Our research delved into the effectiveness of existing trade agreements in creating jobs in migrant-sending countries, with a focus on Central America. We analyzed the impact that the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, or CAFTA-DR, has had on apparel exports and jobs since being ratified by the U.S. and six countries – Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic – from 2005 to 2009.
CAFTA-DR was aimed at encouraging trade and investment ties. But restrictive provisions, particularly its rules of origin, have hindered the region’s ability to benefit fully from the agreement. Under a “triple transformation” clause, only garments assembled in one of the countries from fabrics and constituent fibers originating from the region qualify for free-trade benefits.
This significantly limits the scope for trade expansion because of the limited range of fabrics produced in the region compared with the global market. For example, it means that many modern fabrics, like the kinds used in some stretchy jeans, do not qualify.
Loosening the rules to allow for new fabrics would not only attract investment and create more jobs for Central Americans, it could also reduce immigration from the region by as much as 67%, according to our estimates.
At present, about 500,000 people work in the apparel industry in Central America. It is labor-intensive, and expanding exports would increase employment. Our research shows that loosening the rules of origin to include new fabrics from outside the region would create about 120,000 direct jobs.
If a stronger relationship between exports and employment is assumed, this figure could even rise to about 257,500 jobs, our figures show.
And these jobs would be boosted by additional indirect employment around the expanding factories in Central America needed to accommodate the increased trade.
If would-be migrants in Central America instead chose the new apparel jobs in their home countries, we estimate that migration from Central America to the U.S. could fall by 30% to 67%.
Why it matters
The migration crisis has taken center stage in U.S. political discourse, with Republicans in Congress holding up legislation, including aid to Ukraine, over their demands that tougher border security measures be included as part of any package.
In December 2023, the number of U.S. Border Patrol encounters with migrants at the U.S.-Mexico border hit a record high of almost 250,000, and it remained high during the first few months of 2024.
While human rights violations, security issuesand corruption in migrant-sending countries are often cited as driving factors, in many cases, immigrants are seeking job opportunities that are unavailable in their home countries.
But despite the increased political attention on immigration, trade policy – which could be used to address the scarcity of secure, well-paying jobs in Central American countries with heavy migrant outflows – has largely been absent from either party’s strategy to address the “root causes” of migration.
We believe addressing the root causes of the current border crisis requires creating good jobs in migrant-sending countries.
What still isn’t known
We looked only at one industry – apparel – in Central America and the Dominican Republic, a Caribbean nation.
Academic reviews suggest that as many as half of all trade agreements have no significant effect on trade flows, and only about one-quarter of them increase trade. In fact, trade agreements may even create barriers to trade by adding additional clauses that are complicated or too restrictive.
The key question is how to make all trade agreements more effective at creating jobs in migrant-sending countries. Identifying and relaxing barriers within trade agreements is, we believe, an important first step toward reducing emigration.
The Research Brief is a short take on interesting academic work.
In 2021, the Mosbacher Institute received funding for Bush School student research from the American Apparel and Footwear Association while Raymond Robertson was the director. The AAFA provided neither funding nor any other form of support, including any direct or indirect support, for the research described in this article.
Kaleb Girma Abreha does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organization that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
The Amazing Story Of The Man Who Created The Latest Narco-State In The Americas, And How The United States Helped Him Every Step Of The Way − Until Now
When Juan Orlando Hernández was convicted by a federal jury in Manhattan in early March 2024, it marked a spectacular fall from grace: from being courted in the U.S. as a friendly head of state to facing the rest of his life behind bars, convicted of cocaine importation and weapons offenses.
“Juan Orlando Hernández abused his position as President of Honduras to operate the country as a narco-state where violent drug traffickers were allowed with virtual impunity,” said U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland following the jury conviction. Anne Milgram, administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, added: “When the leader of Honduras and the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel work hand-in-hand to send deadly drugs into the United States, both deserve to be accountable.”
The conviction was a victory for the Justice Department and the DEA. During Hernández’s two terms in office, from 2014 to 2022, he and his acolytes transported more than 400 tons of cocaine into the United States, according to U.S. prosecutors. The former head of state now faces a mandatory sentence of up to 40 years in prison; sentencing is scheduled for June 26.
Furthermore, the way Hernández came to power and maintained that position for so long could provide “Exhibit A” in any indictment of U.S. policy toward Central America – and Latin America more generally – over the past few decades.
Growing ties with cartels
Up to Hernández’s arrest in Tegucigalpa, the Honduran capital, and extradition to the United States in January 2022, his biggest enabler had been none other than the U.S. government itself.
Presidents Barack Obama, Donald Trumpand Joe Biden all backed Hernández and allowed him to inflict enormous harm to Honduras and to the United States in the process.
How so? To answer this question, some background is needed.
On June 28, 2009, a classic military coup took place in Honduras. In the wee hours of the morning, while still in his pajamas, President Manuel “Mel” Zelaya was unceremoniously escorted by armed soldiers from his home and flown to a neighboring country. The coup leaders alleged that, by calling for a referendum on reforming the Honduran Constitution, the government was moving toward removing the one-term presidential term limit enshrined in the country’s charter and opening the door to authoritarianism.
Initially, then-President Barack Obama protested the coup and took measures against those responsible – the right-wing opponents of Zelaya.
The coup-makers simply ran the clock against the upcoming election date and installed their own candidate in the presidency, Porfirio Lobo of the National party, whose son Fabio was also later convicted of cocaine trafficking.
Washington looks the other way
Lobo laid the foundations of Honduras as the new century’s first narco-state, allowing drug cartels to infiltrate the highest echelons of government and the security apparatus as cocaine trade became an increasingly central plank of the country’s economy.
The dollars continued to flow when Lobo was succeeded in 2013 by his buddy and fellow National party member, Juan Orlando Hernández.
In 2017, Hernández – an ardent supporter of the 2009 coup – ran for a second term after the Supreme Court of Honduras pronounced this to be perfectly legal.
Despite widespread allegations of election fraud, the U.S. quickly recognized the result, congratulating Hernández on his win.
Emboldened by his success, Hernández continued to build up Honduras as the new century’s first narco-state of the Americas.
In 2018, the president’s brother, Juan Antonio “Tony” Hernández, a former member of the Honduran Parliament, was arrested in the United States for his association with the Cartel de Sinaloa, the Mexican drug cartel. This entity valued his services so much that they named a particular strain of cocaine after him, stamping the bags as “TH.” Tony Hernández was convicted on four charges in 2019, sentenced to 30 years in prison, and has been in U.S. federal prison ever since.
President Hernández denied any association with the cartel, but the evidence pointed to the contrary. As reported in The Economist, in a New York City trial, one accused drug trafficker alleged that Hernández took bribes for “helping cocaine reach the United States.” Another witness testified that the president had taken two bribes in 2013, before being elected; a former cartel leader testified that the president had been paid $250,000 to protect him from being arrested.
Honduras became a narco-state, in part, because U.S. policymakers looked the other way as it did so. They embraced Hernández because he was ideologically more palatable and subservient to Washington’s wishes compared with his rival, Zelaya. But as the trial verdict in Manhattan makes clear, it was a decision with disastrous consequences.
As one State Department official put it, “Today’s verdict makes all of us who collaborated with (Hernández) look either complicit or gullible.”
The latter may be the more charitable assessment. But the truth is more uncomfortable.
I am a member of the Party for Democracy in Chile and and affiliated with the Foro de Political Exterior, a Chilean foreign policy think tank.